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From the interwar period (1918-1939) to the present, the United States has been involved in 
the Middle East not only in a military capacity, but as a creator and funder of educational 
programs in the region, especially for women, most frequently in Afghanistan. Although 
there is existing literature which examines the numerous and complex political effects of US 
intervention via such educational programs, this paper analyzes how previous US educational 
programs in the wider Middle East create a historical basis for colonial feminism which 
drove these programs and still persists today. This ideology is one that ultimately harms the 
women targeted, in this case Afghan women, in that it constructs these women as requiring 
Western salvation from their native cultures while simultaneously disregarding their voices 
and agency. Due to its self-interested nature, colonial feminism in these education programs 
has allowed for and excused ideologies that undermine Afghan women’s rights, such as 
the mujahedeen and the Taliban. Additionally, colonial feminist educational programs 
distort or ignore sociopolitical and cultural factors that affect women. In Afghanistan, these 
include internal colonization, gender politics as they relate to political legitimacy, and the 
problematization of “the veil” by the US, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. The paper 
critiques past and present US educational programs using this lens to advocate a move away 
from the historical, socio-politically destructive colonial feminist approach by putting Afghan 
women’s voices and agency first in future programs.
Keywords: Afghanistan, education, gender politics, Westernization, colonial feminism
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Introduction 
Although there is much debate and research surrounding the US military involvement 
in Afghanistan and the Middle East, far less attention is given to US historical and current 
involvement in educational programs in the region. This is surprising, as US educational 
programs have played significant roles in the attempted Westernization and in some 
cases, the subsequent sociopolitical destabilization of these countries. This phenomenon is 
particularly prevalent in Afghanistan, where US educational programs have fostered the rise 
of fundamentalist Islamist movements and paved the way for US military intervention. 
This intervention was in large part justified with the argument that Afghan women 
need to be “saved” from fundamentalist Islam1 and “given” rights and freedom by the West, 
usually via educational programs. Indeed, women’s rights have always been thoroughly 
entangled with US educational programs in the region, whether those programs seek to 
educate women or to advance US policy goals, both of which undermine women’s rights as 
they have in Afghanistan.   
In order to understand the influence and importance of modern-day US educational 
programs in Afghanistan and for Afghan women, an analysis of the United States’ historical 
involvement in education in the Middle East is needed, both during the interwar period 
(1920 -1939) and from the Cold War period (1947-1996) to present day. This historical analysis 
will include a feminist anthropologist lens which argues that many of these educational 
programs utilize or otherwise benefit from “colonial feminism.” This philosophy, coined by 
Islam scholar Leila Ahmed in 1992, seeks to construct the generalized “Muslim woman” as a 
damsel in distress. Under colonial feminism, she must be transformed via Westernization in 
order to be “saved” from the sociopolitical and cultural factors that colonial feminists perceive 
as oppressive to Muslim women, regardless of Muslim women’s actual perspectives (Abu-
Lughod 784-785). 
The colonial feminism aspect of the analysis will thus focus on relevant sociopolitical 
and cultural factors historically and presently affecting Afghan women, with each factor 
presented in the historical context it most closely relates to. The interwar period focuses on 
the internal colonization in the formation of the Afghan state, followed by instances of early 
colonial feminist educational programs in the Middle East (Iran and Egypt) that preface future 
US educational programs in Afghanistan. The Cold War period focuses on Afghanistan’s 
gender politics as they relate to political legitimacy, highlighting how US educational 
programs shifted from previous Middle Eastern programs to using Islam as a social force 
rather than erasing it. Initially this was to work towards a mutually beneficial modernization 
but shifted to support radicalized fundamentalist Islam to combat communism, at the expense 
of Afghan women. The Talibantopresent period will focus on the problematization of “the 
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veil” as a fundamentally and harmfully misunderstood custom that was a major symbol in the 
US government’s response to 9/11, framing military intervention as a way to “liberate” women 
and tying this liberation to a Western education. In this paper, “the veil” refers to the general 
practice of veiling by many Muslim women. This term encompasses the many different types 
of veils, like the hijab, shayla, or niqab, and should not be confused with the more specific 
burqa, which is a term used when relevant instead of the general “veil.” 
The overarching goal of this historical analysis is to examine how US educational 
programs 1) ultimately failed in being effective and beneficial to the Afghan people, 2) led 
to the rise of Islamist movements, specifically the fundamentalist mujahedeen and the later 
Taliban, and 3) negatively affected Afghan women directly and indirectly as a result of colonial 
feminist ideology. 
This historical analysis is followed by a present-day case study of the recent USAID 
education program Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs Project (Promote). 
In the past, Promote has been presented as a progressive educational program that supports 
and furthers the interests of Afghan women and Afghan people as a whole. However, this 
case study will explore how the United States’ continuing, albeit more subtle, colonial 
feminist approach and related failure to address sociopolitical instability influenced by the 
US government in Afghanistan shapes educational program goals and execution, ultimately 
negatively affecting their efficacy.  
Through reviewing the US government’s2 mistakes in educational programs in 
Afghanistan as well as laying out the policy recommendations issued by Afghan women 
and women’s groups, this analysis seeks to form a more successful educational program that 
rejects the historically colonial feminist approach, and in doing so puts the best interests of 
the Afghan people, particularly women, first.  Not only will this involve an analysis of past 
programs and inclusion of Afghan voices, but also an analysis of the underlying turmoil in 
Afghanistan that has hindered past programs, and how the US has played a part in it.
Historical Analysis 
Interwar Period 
Afghanistan gained independence from Britain in 1919; however, despite Afghan 
efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the US, they refused to grant Afghanistan 
diplomatic recognition until 1934 when American diplomats and businessmen persuaded 
President Roosevelt that to do so was in the United States’ best interests (Poullada 
179, 180). In large part, this long avoidance was due to biased misperceptions about 
the country based in orientalism and Western superiority. These misperceptions are 
exemplified in a memo from the US State Department’s Middle East “expert,” Wallace 
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Murray, in 1930: 
Afghanistan is doubtless the most fanatic, hostile country in the world today. There 
are no capitulatory or extra-territorial rights to protect foreigners. There is no pretense 
of according to Christians equal rights with Moslems. There are no banks and treasure 
caravans are plundered. The British have for years absolutely forbidden any white 
British subject from entering Afghanistan and though Nadir Shah is sound, he cannot 
control the tribes and will soon fall. (179)
Murray was at least correct that Nadir Shah would be unable to maintain political authority 
as he was assassinated in 1933 and succeeded by his son Zahir Shah, the first Afghan 
ruler to gain US recognition and the last Afghan king (Britannica). Despite this, Murray’s 
perception of Afghanistan as lawless, hyper-Islamic, and politically unstable is lacking the 
context of Afghanistan’s role in the colonial system that continued in various ways even after 
independence in a phenomenon referred to here as “internal colonization.” 
The historical background of Afghanistan’s internal colonization is vital to an 
understanding of US involvement in Afghan women’s education, because colonization 
provides insight into the reasons why the US viewed post-independence interwar Afghanistan 
as so hostile to such educational programs. This historical analysis will also include US 
educational programs in Iran and Egypt to encompass the larger context of colonial feminist 
policies during the interwar period. 
First, Afghanistan is similar to Iran in that the population is over 99% Muslim (Diamant) 
which, to the US government, suggested a homogeneity via this shared Muslim identity – 
however, this could not be further from the reality. Murray hints at the “tribes” which Nadir 
Shah could not “control,” likely referring to the Pashtun tribes, who formed a confederation 
now called the Durrani which then served as the basis for the modern Afghan state 
(Kandiyoti 172). However, there are many other ethnic groups in Afghanistan’s population: 
approximately 42% are Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, 2% 
Baloch, and 4% “other” (“Afghanistan Population 2020”). The fact that the Pashtun represent 
a plurality of Afghanistan’s population has resulted in an attempted “Pashtunization” of the 
country that resembles internal colonization as the ruling tribes who have become an “urban-
based state elite” enact the policies most beneficial to them (Kandiyoti 172). Ironically, this 
Pashtunization and creation of an Afghan “state” was aided by the British, who supplied 
Pashtun tribes with financial subsidies and arms from 1880 until Afghan independence in 
order to shape Afghanistan into a “buffer state” that could defend any Russian advance into 
British India (172).  
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Afghanistan’s role as a buffer state and continued internal colonization made moves 
towards centralization and modernization risky, including any reforms in education or 
women’s statuses (Kandiyoti 172). Yet, reforms were still attempted, notably by Amanullah 
Khan, who ruled from 1919-1929 and passed progressive legislation including a 1921 family 
law banning child marriage, a mandate limiting polygamy, and allowing widows to leave 
the control of their husbands’ families (173-174). Queen Consort Soraya Tarzi continued her 
husband’s policies when he appointed her Minister of Education. In this position, she worked 
specifically to “educate and liberate the women of Afghanistan,” often drawing upon Western 
ideas, yet also emphasizing the importance of Islamic values and women’s importance within 
Islam (Syed 109-110).    
This environment might have seemed ideal for US involvement via women’s 
educational programs in Afghanistan. However, Amanullah Khan’s modernizing reforms 
were seen by many in Afghanistan as undermining tribal and religious authority and he was 
subsequently overthrown in 1928 via tribal uprising (Kandiyoti 174). This uprising was also 
likely motivated by Amanullah Khan’s high taxation and the apparent Western influences 
on his policies, both aspects of internal colonization in Afghanistan (174). This push and pull 
between reforms and internal colonization would continue in the Cold War era. 
However, though the US government viewed Afghanistan as unstable and hostile to 
foreign intervention, particularly in a religious context, this US wariness during the interwar 
period did not extend to its neighbor, Iran. Indeed, many American missionaries saw it as their 
duty to get involved in Iran, especially in promoting the education of Iranian women through 
a Christian lens, perceived as more unwelcome in Afghanistan. 
In comparison, Iran underwent a “transition from the fanaticism of 1898, which 
opposed education for girls as a menace to society” to “the liberalism of 1936” when women’s 
education became more popular (Woodsmall 144). Two Iranian women, Sadigeh Khanum 
Daulutabadee and Khanum Azamodeh, led this push for promoting women’s education (145). 
However, over half of the women’s schools in Iran were private, affiliated with or wholly run 
by American missionaries. This privatization of women’s education limited the chance to be 
educated only to the Iranian elite (Zirinsky 190), which would lead to a deepening of class 
divisions not uncommon in these educational programs, and which is still evident in modern 
US educational programs for women in Afghanistan, such as Promote.
Not only did these educational programs deepen class divisions, they also prioritized 
Westernizing education over more traditional educations with an Islamic foundation. Ruth 
Frances Woodsmall, an American teacher and women’s rights advocate in the region, 
compared these American missionary schools to “the dull, damp room connected with some 
mosque” of the preexisting “Koran schools,” or madrasas,3  which contrasted the “well-
ordered schoolroom, its maps and blackboard, its orderly atmosphere, and young teachers” 
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(Woodsmall 149). This prioritization of Western education and disparaging tone towards 
Islamic education perpetuated a sense of Western superiority that was reflected in the staffing 
choices at these institutions. American missionary schools in Iran employed both American 
and “national” teachers, but American teachers were paid higher salaries even when the 
Iranian teachers were equally qualified for the positions (Zirinsky 190). Many Iranian teachers 
graduated from mission schools themselves, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of the mission 
schools’ Americanizing teachings designed to last (191).  
These schools for Iranian girls emphasized a move away from the madrasas and a move 
not simply towards but directly into Americanization. In these schools, girls were instructed 
in everything from writing and arithmetic to sewing and cooking to dressing like American 
women. Most significantly, this included doing away with “the veil,” regardless of the actual 
students’ thoughts on the matter and in direct opposition to Islamic traditions (Zirinsky 190-
192). Westerners like Woodsmall praised unveiling as a step towards equality between men 
and women, and in doing so widened the gap of misunderstanding. This caused continuous 
tension and even led to violence in the interwar period between American missionaries and 
the people they claimed to be helping. 
One of these cases is the “Port Said Orphan Scandal of 1933,” in which a Muslim girl 
named Turkiyya Hasan was caned as punishment for refusing to pray, or simply obey, at the 
Swedish Salaam Mission. It resulted in national outrage and fueled the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, among other Islamist movements. Though the Muslim Brotherhood’s officially 
stated reason for existing was “to rejuvenate Islamic practice in a modern context” (Baron 
123), it was a direct response to the increasing encroachment upon Islam and Islamic culture 
by the British occupation, missionaries, and general Westernization guided in part by colonial 
feminism.  
In the wake of the Turkiyya Hasan scandal, missionaries, Americans among them, 
failed to recognize the gravity and complexity of the situation (Baron 135). They came up 
with conspiracies to explain the conflict, when in fact they were the cause of what many 
Muslims saw as “evangelical brutality” through education (136). This brutality was a cause 
of great concern, perceived as a threat to the most vulnerable of the population, children – 
in this case, girls. Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood continued to spread 
into an Islamist movement in Egypt, one which ultimately proved to uproot Swedish and 
American missionaries alike by 1933 (138). No matter how good their intentions might have 
been to “empower” Muslim girls, the missionaries’ lack of understanding and dialogue with 




Colonial feminism is inherently self-interested. Among other reasons, this is why 
colonial feminism does not lead to effective educational programs, which logically should have 
the students’ best interests in mind, not the teachers’. Student interests are further harmed 
when teachers’ interests change as they did in the Cold War era, when Afghanistan stood 
once more as a “buffer state,” this time between the Soviet Union and American interests 
of containing communism (Shirazi 218). This shift in the intent of US educational programs 
in Afghanistan corresponded to a shift from subtler colonial feminism to overt colonialism, 
in favor of policies that were blatantly not in the best interests of the students – in this case, 
Afghan women.
However, before US involvement during the Cold War period, Afghanistan saw a 
period of increased modernization and subsequent educational reform, with laws passed 
under Prime Minister Daoud between 1953 to 1963 supporting voluntary removal of the 
veil, an end to enforced purdah, and granting women voting and election rights (Kandiyoti 
174). This modernization became radicalized in the 1978 Saur Revolution, when the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power via a military coup and, in a more 
extreme mirroring of Amanullah’s previous internally colonial policies, began passing land 
reform laws, overhauling family legislation, and focusing on improving women’s literacy 
and participation in the public sphere (174). The marked difference was that the PDPA was 
“transparently beholden to the Soviet Union,” which undermined the party’s claims to 
political legitimacy by marking them to many Afghans as aligned with a foreign, potentially 
colonial power (174). 
Political legitimacy in Afghanistan is closely related to gender politics, and to the events 
of the Cold War period in Afghanistan, making it another vital aspect of understanding US 
involvement in Afghan women’s education. Traditional Afghan concepts of rule and authority 
are rooted in honor, which is rooted in tribal gender relations. These relations, at least when 
strictly interpreted, are framed as a form of “complementarity” in which men and women 
have “mutually recognized rights and obligations,” including women’s obligation to be 
virtuous and men’s obligation to command them. It is from these obligations that honor is 
derived (Kandiyoti 180). Therefore, it is not difficult to see that conflict could arise when the 
PDPA, which may have respected some Islamic laws but was tied to a foreign, secular power, 
passed reforms that would undermine the conservative concept of honor by equalizing gender 
relations and, more pertinently, undermining men’s obligation and ability to control their 
female kin (174). 
The US government may not have fully understood the beliefs behind this Afghan 
resistance to the PDPA or general communism, but they recognized it as a potential tool to 
further anti-communist Cold War policies. Unlike the interwar missionary work in other 
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Middle Eastern countries, the US in the Cold War period took a different approach to Islamic 
education. Initially, rather than eliminate Islamic education in favor of secularization or 
Christianity, American education initiatives like The Teachers College at Columbia University 
(TCCU) in 1954 saw the power of Islam as a social force in Afghanistan, capable of working 
in tandem with Western ideology to “modernize” or Westernize the country (Shirazi 213). 
Although the TCCU was originally working to utilize the “flexibility of Islamic faith” as a 
positive tool to reform education in Afghanistan and a potential step away from colonial 
ideology, this policy would change after the aforementioned Saur Revolution and the 
following Soviet invasion in 1979 (215).
The invasion and answering Afghan uprising prompted the US to provide a huge influx 
of weaponry and funding for humanitarian aid and education to the Afghan rebels (Yaqub 21). 
This US aid enabled the proliferation of radicalized, militaristic madrasas in refugee camps 
along the Afghan border, which allowed for increasing indoctrination of students into “jihadist 
warriors,” or mujahedeen, to combat Soviet communism (Shirazi 221). 
Far from halting this radical Islamist fervor, the US government actively encouraged it. 
From 1986-1992, even after the Soviets left Afghanistan, organizations including USAID, UNO, 
and the Education Center for Afghanistan, which was supported by seven ISI and CIA aided 
mujahedeen groups, oversaw the printing of violent, anti-Soviet, pro-radical Islam textbooks 
for children in elementary school (Shirazi 222). These included calls to anti-Soviet action as 
early as learning the alphabet: “alef is for Allah, jim is for jihad, and shin is for Shakir, who 
conducts jihad with his sword. God becomes happy with the defeat of the Russians” (222). 
These textbooks and their content may have not espoused particularly American ideals, but 
they were anti-Soviet, anti-communist, and pro-military, all of which helped to advance US 
policy goals. 
These ideologies opposed and harmed the women’s rights movement in Afghanistan. 
However, because of the PDPA’s radical reform the women’s rights movement in Afghanistan, 
despite their opposition, were associated with the PDPA and as a result with socialist and 
Marxist ideology (Moghadam 50). Unsurprisingly, the US government did not align itself with 
this movement, but rather with militarized Islamic fundamentalism, an ideology that gave rise 
to mujahedeen leaders. One such leader is Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, a staunch anti-communist, 
“favorite of the Reagan administration,” and future prime minister of the authoritarian 
government that led to the 1996 Taliban takeover in response to the mujahedeen, or “warlord,” 
regime (Rubin 287). In 1970, Hekmatyar participated with other mujahedeen in splashing acid 
on and shooting at the legs of women in “Western” dress. The violent acts he and his followers 
committed against women were not addressed by the US government, despite a protest of 
5,000 Afghan women and girls in the aftermath (Moghadam 51). These protests were not small 
or unorganized events, nor was the larger women’s rights movement. Yet the US government 
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chose to overlook this to pursue total defeat of the Soviets, and thus institutionalized ideology 
that actively harmed women’s rights in Afghanistan. In doing so the US revealed both 
the inherent self-interest of colonial feminism and the beginning of the US government’s 
problematic and inconsistent usage of Islam as an educational and rhetorical tool to either 
undermine or “support” Afghan women’s rights.
Taliban-to-Present Period
After Taliban forces captured Kabul in September of 1996, Afghan women’s role became 
primarily “to function as symbols of legitimization for political groups led by men,” at the 
expense of their human rights, and though some women resisted, they had little international 
support (Barnett 291-292). It was not until after 9/11 in 2001 that the US officially acted against 
the Taliban, and they did so not to help Afghan women, but to fight the War on Terror.
When delving into this period of US involvement in Afghan women’s education, it is 
first vital to interrogate the rhetoric used by major US figures regarding women’s rights in 
Afghanistan, which constructs Afghan women in what anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod calls 
a “new colonial feminism” (Barrnett 787). In November 2001, shortly after the US-led invasion 
of Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush told the American people, “the fight against terrorism is 
also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.” But this was not the United States’ primary 
goal. 
If the US had truly sought to fight for the rights and dignity of Afghan women, then it 
makes little sense that the US did not intervene sooner. Afghan women lived under oppressive 
Taliban rule for five years after the 1996 takeover, without any US intervention, despite 
the United States’ indirect involvement in the Taliban’s creation (Rubin 288). This rhetoric 
justifies military intervention for the War on Terror on moral grounds disguised as feminism.  
However, this is a form of feminism that resembles the oppressive rhetoric of Woodsmall’s 
missionaries, who claimed to be empowering women by the mere application of Western 
ideals, not by actually addressing systemic issues like sociopolitical instability. 
This new colonial feminism is tied to the image of the full-body burqa, which the US 
has used as a symbol of “the ultimate sign of the oppression of Afghan women under the 
Taliban” (Abu-Lughod 785).  However, as Palestinian-American anthropologist Lila Abu-
Lughod points out, the burqa was not a creation of the Taliban formed to oppress women, but 
rather originally the traditional garb of some Pashtun women. To these women, the burqa is 
“symbolizing modesty or respectability,” and can be seen as a form of “portable seclusion,” 
which actually allows women greater mobility while still keeping purdah (785). None of the 
veils, of which there are many styles with many different social signifiers, are meant to signify 
oppression or Arab “backwardness,” as many Western cultures including the US have often 
wrongly interpreted them (Pratt). 
148
When garb like the burqa are used in a way that appears to restrict women, as with the 
Taliban, the burqa itself is not at fault, nor is the culture that created it, nor the women wearing 
it. The fault here is of the fundamentalist Islamic ideology of the Taliban, which is based on 
ethnic lines and the need to assert power, masculinity, and national identity in a nation-state 
wracked by war. This violent instability was in part sparked through violent radical Islamic 
ideology, which the US government actively encouraged, a responsibility the US government 
is now detached from, placing itself instead in the role of the Afghan women’s savior.
This new colonial feminism is not confined solely to the rhetoric used by the Bush 
administration; the US government garnering public support using the plight of Afghan 
women is pervasive. In October 2001, the US launched “Operation Enduring Freedom – 
Afghanistan.” The “liberation of Afghans, particularly women,” was the stated goal for this 
US intervention against the Taliban regime; however the War on Terror remained the US 
government’s highest priority, “whatever the costs to Afghans and stability in the region” 
(Niland 4). 
Eighteen years later, this new colonial feminism has served to fuel a war that has cost 
the US nearly $2 trillion, and has cost the Afghan people their rights, dignity, and stability. 
In Afghanistan, the cost of war falls especially heavily on women, because “as in all war-torn 
societies, women suffer disproportionately” (Bohn). The Taliban controls 60% of the country, 
as much territory as in 2001, and approximately 3,000 civilians were killed and 5,000 injured 
in 2018 alone. About two-thirds of Afghan women do not attend school, and the literacy rate is 
roughly 13% for women. US and international aid have so far failed to fix this statistic, despite 
huge investments into programs aimed at “advancing women’s rights” like Promote, a “flop” 
which TIME calls “a waste of taxpayers’ money” (Bohn).
Currently, the US is engaged in peace talks with the Taliban, and the Afghan 
government has not yet been included. Nor had any Afghan women, until 3,500 of them 
organized their own jirga (tribal council) to outline and emphasize what they want from 
the peace process in February. Their biggest concerns included education, justice, economic 
opportunity, and the protection of their constitutional rights. So far, the US government has 
not included Afghan women on an official level (Gharib), continuing this historical cycle 
of alternately ignoring or supporting the rights and voices of Afghan women for the sake 
of achieving US goals in the region, even when those goals are supposedly to help Afghan 
women.
Case Study 
The historical background may seem like a grim precedent for current and future US 
educational programs in Afghanistan; however it can also be seen as a guide for what not to 
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do, serving as a warning against colonial feminist ideology and self-interested policies that 
undermine sociopolitical stability. “Promote” can also be seen as an educational program with 
plenty of room for improvement, because although it does not seem to be inciting uprisings 
or indoctrinating soldiers, it is not an effective program, and the steps to making it one are 
currently well-within the United States’ reach. 
The Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs Project, colloquially 
referred to as “Promote,” is a $216 million USAID program billed as “the world’s biggest 
program ever designed purely for female empowerment” (United States, Congress, SIGAR 
18-69 Audit Report 2). It is also a program that has, according to an audit report and quarterly 
report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), spectacularly 
failed in executing its goal of empowering 75,000 Afghan women (United States, Congress, 
SIGAR 18-69 Audit Report 2).
Due to Promote’s lack of a baseline study, general disorganization, poor 
communication, possible internal corruption, and changing of stated goals when it failed 
to meet those goals, it is difficult to tell if any women were concretely helped through 
Promote’s four component programs: Women’s Leadership Development (WLD), Women in 
Government (WIG), Women in the Economy (WIE), and Musharikat, which focuses on women 
in civil society (United States, Congress, SIGAR 18-69 Audit Report 2). As of September 30, 2017, 
out of these four programs only one, Musharikat, was meeting most (half) of its performance 
indicator targets – this was after these targets had been changed to more “realistic” goals (12). 
USAID/Afghanistan did not set targets for Musharikat’s other eight performance indicators, 
leading SIGAR to conclude they could not fully assess whether Musharikat, or any of the other 
programs, had been effective at all (20).
What went wrong in Promote goes beyond disorganization and a lack of cohesive 
goals. In 2016, a year before releasing the audit outlining Promote’s failures, SIGAR asked 40 
Afghan women in various public sectors about the program, about what they thought could 
be improved, and about what Afghan women truly need in educational programs. Notably, 
SIGAR interviewed Afghan First Lady Rula Ghani, who critiqued Promote for 1) being 
launched too early, 2) having too few female staff (and too few staff in general), 3) putting 
most of the money towards administrative costs and American contractors rather than to 
Afghan women, 4) training women to seek jobs in Afghanistan’s relatively weak economy 
rather than building their own businesses, and 5) targeting a disproportionate number of 
urban women with a high-school education rather than the rural provinces where there is a 
greater need for education (United States, Congress, Quarterly Report 6). These critiques echo 
many of the past issues with American-led educational programs in the region – their focus 
on ‘modernizing’ and ‘empowering’ Afghan women is orchestrated in a Western context and 
ideology.
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Ghani also made a vital point regarding Promote’s apparent intentions to “build 
a cadre of activists and civil-society organizations” focused on “women’s equality and 
empowerment” which she believes will have unanticipated negative consequences, not just 
because of the participants’ young age and political inexperience, but because the US, like 
many other Western powers, is taking a Western approach to gender programs (United 
States, Congress, Quarterly Report 6). Rather than consulting with Afghan women on their 
thoughts and goals regarding their own liberation, US programs like Promote use language 
“singling out ‘women’s rights’ instead of calling for ‘mutual respect between men and 
women,’” which is what Ghani and other Afghan women claim is more culturally resonant 
(9). While this approach may seem too moderate, it has historically proven unhelpful and even 
counterproductive for the US government to project Western feminist ideology onto Afghan 
women. As Helena Malikyar, an Afghan-American scholar and journalist contacted by SIGAR, 
notes, “USAID doesn’t consult Afghan women until it is too late to make any changes,” even 
though programs like Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society in which Afghan women have 
been consulted and Afghan people as a whole have been involved have proven to be more 
effective (United States, Congress, Quarterly Report 11).
Ultimately, SIGAR found that the Afghan women they interviewed believe security 
and corruption remain the two most important issues hindering and endangering Afghan 
women today. Lack of security prevents women from attending school and working, and in 
doing so enforces attitudes that women are too vulnerable to leave the home. Corruption is 
prevalent in politics, the justice system, and the workforce, preventing women from climbing 
social ladders, and leads to misspending in women’s programs like Promote (United States, 
Congress, Quarterly Report 4). Both need to be addressed and improved upon before real 
change can be made. 
Most women interviewed expressed gratitude towards the US and the international 
community for their support – at least, the women SIGAR chose to include in this survey 
did – but wished the US government sought far more input from local Afghan women while 
the programs were being designed to make them more sustainable (United States, Congress, 
Quarterly Report 5), rather than meeting short-term quotas and goals like Promote (4). The 
educational programs these Afghan women argued would be most valuable are programs 
for rural women (4), sponsoring women to study Islamic law in order to improve women’s 
legal protections, entrepreneurial courses and resources, and giving more attention and 
funding to programs beyond primary school (16, 19, 23). Literacy rates in Afghanistan remain 
low, especially for women, but it is clear that not only are Afghan women hopeful about 
their futures, they are advocating for themselves and devising solutions to best solve the 
sociopolitical issues they face, and the issues with US programs like Promote.
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Conclusion  
Based on this joint historical analysis of US educational programs as based in colonial 
feminism and a case study of a current program that is ineffective because it clings to similar 
ideological echoes, it is clear that a sustainable educational program for Afghan women should 
not only include but prioritize the plans and goals of Afghan women. Additionally, this new 
program must contextualize its efforts to improve Afghan women’s rights within the larger 
historical and cultural context of Afghanistan-US relations with women, education, and their 
intersection.
Before this program is implemented, or in conjunction with its development and 
launch, the US government must work to restore stability and security in Afghanistan, with the 
ultimate goal of achieving peace and withdrawing troops. This can begin with diplomatically 
addressing the issues of corruption and security identified by the women SIGAR interviewed, 
which contributed to Promote’s failure. In particular, the US government should reform the 
Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), which are programs 
the US government created and which now pose threats to women and rural communities via 
widespread violence, sexual assault, and drug trafficking (Niland 9). This can be enacted via 
the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in partnership with the 
Afghan government. This partnership with the Afghan government should also extend to US 
and Taliban peace talks to avoid giving sole political legitimacy to the Taliban. Inclusion of the 
Afghan government includes Afghan women, whose voices the US government must listen to 
and engage with in every step of the peacemaking process. 
As a more stable foundation is established, USAID should be required to work more 
closely with SIGAR and USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) while developing this 
new education program in order to establish an accurate baseline, analyze sustainability, 
maintain financial transparency, and overall avoid Promote’s mistakes. USAID should also 
design the program in partnership with NGOs founded by Afghan women, such as the Afghan 
Women’s Network (AWN) and the New Afghanistan Women Association (NAWA). Coalition 
with the Afghan government, particularly the women in it, would ensure the program has 
state support and in turn supports the long-term stability of the state. This new education 
program should also strive for a majority-female, majority-Afghan staff. The number of 
Afghan women on staff should increase over the program’s lifetime. 
Like Promote, this program should have component programs; unlike Promote, these 
component programs will be created based on the recommendations of Afghan women. Based 
on SIGAR interviews, they might resemble this: 
1. Women in Law (WIL): Sponsoring women to study Islamic law under internationally 
recognized scholars to improve women’s legal protections, aiding the formal court system to 
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reduce corruption and increase women’s options for legal recourse. 
2. Women in Business (WIB): Focus on entrepreneurial courses, marketing products, and 
creating formal organizations for women to pool resources and create business models. 
3. Wuleswali4:  Focus on rural women, with the idea that this is a foundational program 
based in improving literacy, health/reproduction education, and primary schooling, and will 
expand to include higher levels of schooling past the sixth-grade level as need demands. 
4. Musharikat: Shift away from Western feminist activist ideals of “empowerment” 
and Americanization and towards language of inclusion and respect between genders, work 
in partnership and support with local Afghan women’s activists groups, both Islamic, like 
Women for Afghan Women (WAW), and secular, like the Revolutionary Association of the 
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). 
Promote used only $181 million from the $216 million of its allocated funds. This 
program should aim for a $200 million budget, with a total ceiling on the contract of $400 
million to allow up to $200 million from international contributions. Promote was designed 
for 5 years, but this program should be designed for at least 10 years. This design will include 
the condition that if both Afghan and American constituents agree on the program’s success 
after 5 years, the program will be placed under Afghan control, likely with US funds, with the 
ultimate goal of self- sufficiency. 
Promote did not fail Afghan women to the degree that missionary schools and  
militarized madrasas did, but the program’s aforementioned shortcomings and critiques 
stem from the same underlying reasons – instability created by the US government’s actions 
based on US goals surrounding both Westernization and eradicating “the enemy,” whether 
communist or terrorist. These actions were taken purely for US benefit while claiming to help 
the Afghan people and to save Afghan women. However, after eighteen years, the failure of 
this claim is evident. Past strategies, those that place US goals over Afghan goals, that aim to 
Christianize, Westernize, or even radicalize, have not succeeded to Afghan benefit. 
Compared to these past programs, Promote is an improvement because it makes 
an apparent attempt to put Afghan women’s best interests first and the US government 
has finally begun to involve Afghan women in the process of critiquing and reviewing the 
program. Ultimately, Promote was ineffective because the US government refused to shed 
the paternalistic vestiges of its previous colonial feminist involvement in the Middle East and 
Afghanistan. In order to shed them once and for all, Afghan women need to be at the forefront 
of this educational program – not to justify US involvement on moral grounds, but to put an 
end to an eighteen year long war and ultimately leave Afghanistan and its people in a position 
to move forward, and to repair trust in the US as an ally in the years to come.
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Notes
1 It is important to note that the fundamentalist and radical forms of Islam practiced by 
groups like the mujahedeen and Taliban are very different from the religion of Islam as it is 
widely practiced around the world, and just as the KKK or Westboro Baptist Church is not 
accurately representative of Christianity, neither of these groups can be viewed as accurate 
representations of Islam. 
2 I acknowledge that the US government is not a uniform entity and over the course of the 
years this paper covers, many different administrations were involved, often with conflicting 
or multiple positions on the topics covered in this paper, such as women’s rights, education 
programs, and foreign policy. However, for the sake of word limits and because there is a 
great deal of existing literature on US administrations in these eras, this paper focuses more 
closely on Afghan politics and the United States’ intersection with them, and simply draws 
comparisons between various US administrations which have all used or condoned what I 
argue are colonial feminist policies.
3 “Madrasa” is a transliteration for the Arabic word مدرسة‎, used here to mean traditional 
Afghan educational institutions that involve a heavy emphasis on study of Islam; however the 
word itself can be used to refer to any type of educational institution, secular or not.
4 “Wuleswali” is a transliteration of the Pashtun word ولسوالۍ‎, which refers to the 
administrative districts or provinces of Afghanistan.
